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mission� Nasser was willing to give his 
new war minister as close to a blank 
check as could be imagined� Nothing 
was more important than securing a 
victory and expunging the shame of 
1967� Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
became a guaranteed supplier of 
military hardware, not only making 
up the quantitative Egyptian losses but 
substantially improving equipment 
quality as well� Fawzi makes the point 
that the Soviets were less motivated by 
a common ideology in this effort than 
by the need to prove that their equip-
ment was at least on a par with that of 
the United States, and to maintain their 
geopolitical position in the region� Fawzi 
also confirms that the Soviet presence 
on the ground was extensive, that Soviet 
forces not only advised but performed 
certain military duties as well�
Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt 
and improved others� Surface-launched 
ship-to-ship missiles, modern surface-
to-air missile batteries, new armor 
and aircraft all entered the Egyptian 
inventory� Fawzi understood, how-
ever, that new hardware would not be 
enough� Military-school attendance was 
increased, and the military’s intellec-
tual capabilities expanded� But beyond 
that, he explains, the three-year “war 
of attrition” that Egypt waged against 
Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort 
to blood the Egyptian army, test new 
tactics, and deploy new forces� Over this 
period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces 
came to embrace a defensive mind-set, 
while the Egyptian army became 
imbued with the spirit of the offensive� 
Although most books claim Israel won 
the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this 
was not the case� According to Fawzi, 
not only did Israeli jets increasingly 
avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian 
soldiers underwent quantum improve-
ments as well—and these improvements 
were the real war aims of this period� 
It is also clear that whatever strategic 
deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they 
might have against the Egyptians did 
not work when it came to preventing at 
least a limited war� As the Egyptian army 
began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his 
officers crafted plans for what would 
become one of the most successful set-
piece battles of the twentieth century: 
the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal 
and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line�
Reproducing the Infantry articles, com-
plete with their original and somewhat 
repetitive forewords, gives the book 
something of a choppy feel� It is also 
clear that this work is a synopsis of 
Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete transla-
tion� Some readers will be left with a 
desire to know more� Not surprisingly, 
the focus of the book tends to be at 
the strategic level� Readers who want 
more tactical details will have to find 
them elsewhere� Unfortunately for our 
understanding of Egyptian perspectives 
of how the war was waged, Fawzi was re-
lieved of his duties two years before the 
war began and was arrested for conspir-
ing to overthrow Sadat, so this critical 
element is sadly lacking� However, these 
shortcomings pale when compared 
with the value inherent in this work�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military, 
by George E� Reed� Lincoln, Neb�: Potomac 
Books, 2015� 216 pages� $26�50�
Although the term “toxic leadership” has 
recently come into vogue, the U�S� mili-
tary is no stranger to the phenomenon� 
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Any current or former member of 
the armed forces can usually provide 
a firsthand account of a leader he or 
she believes was toxic� So even when a 
very healthy dose of skepticism regard-
ing anecdotal reporting is applied, it is 
surprising that senior military leaders 
have not paid more specific atten-
tion to evaluating to what degree toxic 
leadership has affected their services’ 
personnel and their performance, and 
to determining what to do about it�
George Reed, who carries very respect-
able credentials as both a former Army 
officer with twenty-seven years of 
experience and a civilian scholar, has at 
least begun to examine toxic leadership 
in the U�S� military seriously� For those 
interested in understanding this type 
of leadership, Tarnished is an excel-
lent starting point� However, as Reed 
is laudably quick to point out, more 
work—much more work—is required�
The study of leadership is as fraught as 
it is vital� There is not even a univer-
sally accepted definition of the term� 
The field abounds with conflicting 
theories, mountains of individual case 
studies, and an ever-increasing num-
ber of blandly self-assured “how-to” 
books of questionable utility� Tar-
nished is a welcome change of pace�
Reed begins by defining toxic leader-
ship as “demotivational behavior that 
negatively impacts unit morale and 
climate�” Reed then explores how toxic 
leaders behave and why; in many cases, 
their seniors in the chain of command 
may fail to recognize these behaviors 
and even reward these leaders� This, not 
surprisingly, is in marked contrast to the 
perspectives of toxic leaders’ subordi-
nates and the deep and lasting nega-
tive impact that results from working 
for such a leader� Loss of productivity, 
decreased communication of neces-
sary information to senior leaders, and 
rampant dissatisfaction with not only 
the leader but the service are just some 
of the consequences Reed documents� 
But as serious and at times tragic as 
these results can be, they pale in com-
parison to the loss of combat effective-
ness such units could experience and 
the potential cumulative impact of toxic 
leadership on the profession of arms�
Reed makes a convincing case that a 
toxic leader’s behavior likely stems from 
feelings of inferiority, which, when 
combined with narcissism, creates a 
potentially disastrous mix� The manner 
in which toxic leadership often involves 
ethical breaches is also examined� 
Among the useful ideas presented in 
Tarnished is that toxic leadership is best 
viewed along a spectrum� At one end are 
found true psychopaths, whose numbers 
in the military are likely to be few� At 
the other end of the scale are individu-
als with behaviors that may actually 
be correctable, or at least mitigated�
Part of this book’s allure is Reed’s 
healthy understanding of reality� He 
notes that losing control in the mo-
ment or having a bad day does not 
make a leader toxic� Tarnished does 
offer suggestions for those sentenced to 
work with toxic leaders, but Reed has 
the candor to admit that these sugges-
tions may not work� This is a refreshing 
change from books that suggest that 
“speaking truth to power” will result in 
a happy ending, or those that, having 
identified a problem, offer no solution�
This is not to suggest that Tarnished is 
without flaws� In discussing specific 
cases, there is a tendency to identify 
toxic leaders as “a Navy captain,” or “a 
visiting field officer�” If these cases are 
in the public domain, then providing 
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actual identities would be better� 
Although it is ostensibly devoted to 
military leadership, civilian cases do at 
times move into the narrative� There is 
also a surprising lack of historical cases� 
Were Admiral King, General Patton, 
and General LeMay toxic leaders?
Does the answer matter? One of the 
more difficult questions involving 
toxic leaders is, Do results ever trump 
their behavior? Tarnished claims, quite 
reasonably, that how leadership is 
delivered can be as important as what 
it delivers, or even more important� But 
is that always true? Another question 
that will leave most readers wanting 
more is whether, and to what degree, 
the culture of the U�S� military and the 
nature of the profession of arms rewards 
(some would say demands) attributes 
from leaders that, if not toxic, may seem 
very similar� However, when all is said 
and done, Tarnished is a most welcome 
addition to the discipline of leader-
ship� It belongs in the handful of books 
that should be on the shelves of both 
scholars and practitioners of leadership�
RICHARD J� NORTON
The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Stra-
tegic Posture in the Post-American Era, by Liu 
Mingfu� New York: CN Times, 2015� 288 pages� 
$24�99�
This 2015 publication of the Eng-
lish translation of The China Dream, 
originally published in Chinese in 2010, 
merits reading by a wider Western 
audience wishing to understand a clear 
exposition of a conservative, hawkish 
view of China’s approach to international 
relations� The author, Liu Mingfu, is a 
retired People’s Liberation Army colonel� 
The book does not necessarily represent 
the mainstream view of the Chinese 
general public or the official Chinese 
government position, but it does ring 
more true to the spirit of Chinese 
president Xi Jinping’s current thinking 
than it did to former Chinese president 
Hu Jintao’s approach when the book was 
released in Chinese over five years ago� 
The fact that the foreword for the book 
was written by Liu Yazhou, a princeling 
political commissar of the National De-
fense University, gives the work gravity 
within the Chinese defense community�
Henry Kissinger spent four paragraphs 
in On China (2011) summarizing Liu’s 
views regarding China’s grand goal 
to become number one in the world, 
thereby restoring its historic glory� 
According to Liu, this is to be done 
through cultivating “martial spirit,” not 
through “peaceful rise�” The inherent 
conflict in U�S�-Chinese relations is 
portrayed as a “marathon contest” or 
“duel of the century,” as if world politics 
is a sporting event between a champion 
and a major contender for the global 
championship� Kissinger follows his 
discussion of the Liu triumphalist view 
of the national destiny debate with a 
much longer analysis of State Councilor 
Dai Bingguo’s more moderate reaffir-
mation of the peaceful rise strategy�
Liu begins the first chapter by paying 
homage, Chinese fashion, to his ances-
tors, laying out his interpretation of the 
visions of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and 
Deng Xiaoping for turning China into 
the world’s leading nation� Getting to 
the crux of his argument in the second 
chapter, “The Fight for the Century,” 
Liu clearly blocks out the results of five 
centuries of global political competition� 
Citing George Modelski’s hegemonic sta-
bility theory that there is an approximate 
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